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The events of 19 December 2010, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself afire to protest
the Tunisian dictatorial regime, have since provoked a stunning response across the Middle East
and North Africa. The uprisings that have swept across the region have been swift and strong,
and have shaken leaders to the core, as they decide how to respond to the overwhelming show of
popular discontent.

Some of the uprisings have achieved their desired results, such as the

overthrows of Tunisian leader Ben-Ali, Egyptian president Mubarak, and eventually Libyan
dictator Qaddafi. Others have been less successful, with protests still raging in Syria, Bahrain
and Yemen. 1
In the face of such violent and sudden upheavals in a region that seemed more or less
firmly in the grip of repressive autocratic governments, the international community, including
the United States, has scrambled to coordinate its foreign policy and establish the defensible
positions vis-a-vis each tumultuous country. The United Nations Security Council has taken
little action, except for its authorization of a humanitarian intervention in Libya; 2 the leading
voice of the otherwise silent UN has been its Human Rights Commissioner, Navi Pillay, who has
been swift in condemning the violent reactions of the Arab Spring govemments.3

The United

States, for a while, had remained aloof from the protests, and once it decided to engage, has had
to make up for lost time. Its response, therefore, has been belated, cautious, and also selective. 4

1

See Garry Blight, Sheila Pulliam and Paul Torpey, Arab spring: an interactive timeline ofMiddle East protests,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 20 11), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/20 11/mar/22/middle-east-protestinteractive-timeline.
2
See e.g. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) and S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc S/RES/1973
(March 17, 2011).
3
See e.g. Syria should be referred to ICC, UN's Navi Pillay says, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www .bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16151424; Libya protests: Thousands offoreigners flee violence,
BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12535883; UN human rights chiefNavi Pillay
condemns Cairo deaths, BBCNEWS (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15854418; Bahrain
unrest: UN rights chief criticizes crackdown, BBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 20 II), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-12769168.
4
Ian Black, Barack Obama signals selective US response to 'Arab Spring', THE GUARDIAN (May 19, 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 1 Ilmay/19/barack-obama-response-arab-spring.
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US policy towards the individual countries in the rebelling Middle East has primarily
highlighted human rights and humanitarian concerns. 5 Yet in affirming unyielding support for
"Arab human rights," President Obama, in a big policy speech in May, also said that "America
could not 'prevent every injustice perpetrated by a regime against its people. "'6 This unwieldy
dichotomy of principles-the result of "long years of US support for the[ ... ] now deposed
[Middle Eastern] dictators" 7-has been reconciled in the US' response to the Libyan war by
participation in the United Nations intervention; the US' response to the Syrian violence through
symbolic sanctions and strong condemnation; and the US' response to the Bahrani repression
with tepid statements of admonition and potential withholding of an arms deal.
Despite President Obama's declaration, there is, however, an unspoken and
unacknowledged reason that is better able to provide the rationale for the difference in policy
that permeates the US' responses towards the rebelling countries and that can, in fact, explain for
their differences. That reason is oil. 8 This paper will explore how the presence of oil, or lack
thereof, as well as the safety of the world oil market, is the one factor that can consistently
account for the policies of the United States in its response towards the Arab Spring uprisings.
Part I will examine general US policy towards the oil-producing countries of the Middle
East. Part II discusses the first case study of Libya. Part III delves into the circumstances
surrounding Syria. Part IV turns to Bahrain. Part V links all three countries' rebellions to the
global oil market. Part VI re-states and re-affirms the thesis and concludes.

5

Black, supra note 4. The United States, policies would reflect the "core principles', of"opposing the use of
violence and repression." Id

6

Id

7

ld

8

"If I could speculate, I would say that oil plays an important role in how the international conununity reacts to
certain situations." Sophie Douez, West confronts double standards in Arab response, SWISS INFO (Oct. 19, 20 I I),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/the_arab_spring/West_confronts_double_standards_in_Arab_response.html?ci
d=31383238.
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I.

US Policy Toward the Oil-Producing Middle East

As the world's largest consumer of oil, with 4.7 billion barrels coming from overseas out
of7.1 billion barrels consumed yearly, the United States' foreign oil dependence is an incredibly
significant variable to which it must pay great attention when it creates its foreign policy. 9 As
such, it is a hindrance because it restricts available options that the US can pursue in dealing with
its supplier countries. The US pays out around $1 billion a day to foreign countries for their oil
exports, totaling about 16% of total US import expenditures. 10 This has created a situation of"an
unprecedented and unsustainable transfer of wealth to other countries" whose interests often
diverge from those of the US. 11

Additionally, consumption of oil by the United States is

expected to keep increasing; much of this increase will have to be supplemented by imports in
the near future, as domestic production is likely to stagnate.

12

So foreign oil dependence by the

United States, then, could rise up to 62% of total consumption by 2020. 13
Such a state of affairs thus "holds [the US] hostage" to the caprices of the oil market as
controlled by OPEC, as well as to the political and economic security of the supplier countries. 14
This overdependence would not be such a major problem were it not for the fact that much of the
energy imports flowing into the US are from countries in the Middle East (and North Africa)
with unstable societies and totalitarian governments. 15 All the money with which the US floods

9

!d.; Jonathan Powers, Oil Addiction: Fueling Our Enemies I, TRUMAN NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT (Feb. 17,
20 10), available at http://www. trumanproj ect.org/posts/20 10/02/oil-addiction-fueling -our-enemies. This data is
from 2008.; Keith Crane et. al, Imported Oil and US. National Security 8, RAND CORPORATION (2009), available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG838.html.
10
Powers, supra note 9.
11
!d. (quoting Vice Admiral Dennis McGinn).
12

Oil Diplomacy: Facts and Myths Behind Foreign Oil Dependency, hearing before the H. Common International
Relations, lOth Cong. second session 5 (2002) (statement of the Honorable Spencer Abraham, Secretary, US

Department of Energy).
13
ld at 6.
14 !d. at 1.
15
!d. at 1; Thomas D. Kraemer, Addicted to Oil: Strategic Implications ofAmerican Oil Policy 5, STRATEGIC
STUDIES INSTITUTE (May 2006).
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the oil market "enriches hostile governments, funds terrorist organizations, and props up
repressive regimes." 16 Some of those countries have regimes in power that are "actively hostile
to the United States," such as Iran, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), and Libya (under Qaddafi). 17
Others are unsteady and autocratic, with "regimes beholden to Islamic fUndamentalists like Saudi
Arabia."

18

Just as the totalitarian governments in those oil states have been able to repress their

people and keep themselves in power by sharing their oil wealth, they-and other major supplier
states such as Russia, Iran, and Venezuela-have learned that oil is an effective bargaining chip
against importers like the US. 19 This has made them more willing and able to use their exports
of oil and other energy resources "to pursue their strategic and political objectives."20
The US must grudgingly employ maintenance of the unsavory ties it has with numerous
countries in order to feed its overdependence and prevent those countries from using that
dependence against the US. The gingerly tiptoeing that the US engages in due to the sensitive
nature of its suppliers decreases its international leverage and empowers those types of
repressive governments because the United States is hampered in its ability to pressure them to
change. 21 Such dependence-which is continuing to grow-is "increas[ing] the [ ... ] strategic
vulnerability [of the US] and constrains [its] ability to pursue a broad range of foreign policy and
national security objectives."22 Any type of political, diplomatic, or military action that the US

16
17

Powers~ supra note 9 at 2.
Oil Diplomacy hearing, supra note 12 at 3 (quoting Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos).

ld
Kraemer, supra note 15 at 5; John Deutch and James R. Schlesinger, National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil
Dependency 3, Independent Task Force Report No. 58, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2006).
20
Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 3.
21
Id at3.
22
Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 3. The Report identified five ways in which oil dependence is
affecting US foreign policy: I. "the control over enom1ous oil revenues gives exporting countries the flexibility to
adopt policies that oppose U.S. interests and values;" 2. "oil dependence causes political realignments that constrain
the ability of the United States to form partnerships to achieve common objectives;" 3. "high prices and seemingly
scarce supplies creates fear that the current system of open markets is unable to ensure secure supply ... result[ing]
in oil and gas deals that include political arrangements in addition to commercial terms;" 4. "revenues from oil and
gas exports can undermine local goven1ance;" 5. "a significant interruption in oil supply will have adverse political
18
19
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might consider pursuing against these nations-for whatever reason-could jeopardize the
security of the oil market by threatening the potential disruption of oil flow, whether as a result
of a tactical decision on the part of the supplier country or as a consequence of international
action.

23

Thus "fearing another embargo, [we bend] to the Middle Eastern autocrats and permit

their anti-democratic and anti-American practices to go unanswered." 24
Ensuring a "reliable and affordable supply of oil" has become an increasingly
unavoidable and prominent feature of US foreign policy and has a direct bearing on its
effectiveness. 25 This has resulted in careful diplomacy that has led to some strange alliances and
unintended and unwanted but unavoidable associations with, and support for, leaders whose
policies towards the United States are less than friendly, coloring other countries' views of the
United States. Precisely because of this reason, there is a deep-seated mistrust of American
motives in foreign policy. 26 In pursuing the spread of Western liberal ideals around the world,
there is a greater perceived sense of self-interest in the policies of the US than a sense of
altruism. 27 Other countries whose large economies run substantially on imported oil-Western
Europe, Japan, India, and China for example-face similar suspicions about their motives but on
a much smaller scale. 28 This is because they do not bear the same foreign policy responsibilities
as those assumed by the United States as the world's largest power. 29 The true objectives of the
United States-bringing freedom and democracy to those countries that do not have them-are

economic consequences in the United States and in other importing countries." The Report also highlighted that
there may be a direct relationship between US dependence on oil (particularly from the Persian Gulf) and the size of
its defense budget. !d. at 26-29.
23
!d. at 29; Kraemer, supra note 15 at 3.
24
Oil Diplomacy hearing, supra note 12 at 3 (quoting Ranking Member, Mr. Lantos).
25
Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 3.
26
Kraemer, supra note 15 at 4.
27 !d.
28
Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 5.
29

!d.

seen as being "contaminated" by the pervasive need to maintain oil supply. 30 So much is this a
concern that in

2003~

when the United States went to war in

Iraq~

it had to change the original

name of the operation from "Operation Iraqi Liberation" to "Operation Iraqi Freedom" because
the acronym of the former was O.I.L. 31 Additionally, there were some countries that did not
believe that the US war on terror was a sincere effort to fight international terrorism; rather that
"control[... of] Middle Eastern oil supplies" was the prevailing motive. 32 Such an unsavory
suspicion accompanying US foreign policy actions is unfortunate because the US will continue
to play a role in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf--which, in addition to containing
more than half of the world's oil reserves, is important to the US also for "nonproliferation,
combating terrorism and encouraging political stability, democracy, and public welfare." 33
Given the highly sensitive and strategic role that oil plays in US foreign policy, it is not
surprising to see that it has played a strong role in tailoring the responses to the Arab Spring
uprisings. Many of the rebellions are occurring in precisely those oil-supplying countries that
the US has been loath to antagonize. In order to protect those countries' supplies of oil-and
maintain the stability of the global oil market-the US has intervened in Libya but declined to do
so in Syria and Bahrain.

30

31

Kraemer) supra note 16 at 5.
See e.g. Press Briefmg by Ari Fleischer) Office of the Press Secretary, Mar. 24, 2003) available at

http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030324-4.html.
32
Kraemer, supra note 15 at 4. One such country was Syria, whose president Bashar al-Asad declared that the
United States "is interested only in gaining control over Iraqi oil and redrawing the map of the region in keeping
with its worldview." Eyal Zisser, Syria and the United States: Bad Habits Die Hard, MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY 312 (Summer 2003).
33
Deutch and Schlesinger, supra note 19 at 30; Crane, supra note 9 at II.
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II.

The Libyan Spring

The paradigm of blithely supporting totalitarian oil regimes was, to a large extent,
abandoned when it came to Libya, at least from the time that President Reagan assumed office. 34
Prior to that, the US had had no qualms about being heavily invested in the country-{)ver the 50
year period between 1927 and 1977, imports of oil from Libya to the United States increased
tenfold, and exports to Libya tripled. 35 Beginning in 1973 with the withdrawal of the US
ambassador to Libya and the placement of Libya on the terrorism list in 1979, the United States
began to change its position and ostracize the country and its dictator Muammar Qaddafi. 36
Qaddafi' s support for terrorism and pursuance of weapons of mass destruction, along with
various attacks on American targets led to an intensification of Libya's isolation.37
The US had enacted a whole spectrum of sanctions against the Libyan regime over the
years, covering a wide range of economic, financial, and military areas. 38 Among them were
bans on the importation of crude and refined oil from Libya, the exportation of oil production
and refining equipment from the US, and travel to Libya on a US passport. 39 These effectively
halted any and all US oil investment in the country. After the bombing of the PanAm flight over
Lockerbie, Scotland, the United States was finally vindicated in its isolation of the country and
the rest of the international community became convinced that Qaddafi was a threat. As a result,
the United Nations passed comprehensive sanctions, which were in place for 7 years. 40 The US

34

Jason Pack, Libya is Too Big to Fail, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/20 11/03/18/libya_is_too_big_to_fail.
35

!d.

36

Clyde R. Mark, Cong. Research Serv., 1B93109, LIBYA 1, 4 (May 23, 2002). Such attacks on US targets included
the US embassy burning in 1979 and the Berlin disco bombing in 1986. ld at 5.
37
Pack, supra note 34.
38
Mark, supra note 3 6 at 5.
39

°

4

!d.

From 1992 to 1997. Pack, supra note 34. Those resolutions were numbers 731 and 748 and required that the
sanctions be in place until Libya turned over the Lockerbie bombing suspects. Mark, supra note 36 at 4.

also added the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act in 1996, which barred all contacts between the US and
foreign companies that were invested in Libya's oil industry. 41
The US' and international outlook on Libya slowly began to change as Qaddafi turned
over suspects of the bombing and made overtures for shutting down his nuclear weapons
program. 42 President George W. Bush made Libya a key foreign policy priority during his two
terms in office, seeking to reintegrate it back into the international community. 43 This would not
only be beneficial to Qaddafi, but also to US oil companies, who had been banned from investing
in the country during the time of sanctions. In February 2004, Bush took the unprecedented step
of rescinding the travel ban that had long been in place, allowing US companies to begin
individual negotiations on reentrance into the Libyan market. 44 Two months later, Bush again
eased the sanctions on Libya, thus letting companies begin to buy or invest in Libyan oil
products. 45 The final step was taken in September of2004, when Bush lifted the vast majority of
the remaining sanctions, fully opening up the Libya to US investment and granting complete
access to its markets. 46 Companies began to rush in to "secure new [oil] contracts [and] revive
old ones" to help to modernize the Libyan oil infrastructure in order to take advantage of the
technological advances that had since taken place, particularly in deepwater drilling. 47 At the
time that the momentum from the surrounding Arab Spring uprisings reached Libya, it was
producing 1.6 million barrels of crude oil per day. 48

41

Mark, supra note 36 at 4.
/d
Michael Klare & Daniel Volman, The African 'Oil Rush' and US National Security, 27 THIRD WORLD
QUARTERLY 4, 614 (2006).
44
Id
45 Id
46 Id
47
ld; Neil Ford, US Firms back in Libya, THE MIDDLE EAST 36 (Feb. 2006).
48
Libya oil output to return to pre-war levels next year, BBC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/news/business-15712718.

42
43

~

A.
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The Responses to the Uprising
The protests in Libya began slowly in January 2011, as demonstrations took place across

the country showing solidarity for the events happening in Tunisia.49 They picked up in size and
intensity in mid-February, when a human rights activist was arrested. 5° On February 18, Qaddafi
forces occupied various Libyan towns, attempting to secure them, but they were met with rebel
resistance, particularly in Benghazi. 51 The violence grew as "troops and mercenaries sh[ot]
unarmed demonstrators" in Benghazi; the death toll continued to rise each succeeding day. 52
The protests spread to Tripoli, even as Qaddafi tried to rally his supporters and exhort various
entities (like al-Qaeda and the Islamists) for fomenting the rebellion. 53 On 27 February, scarcely
10 days after the uprisings began, the rebel opposition groups formed the anti -Qaddafi
Transitional National Council, to begin their appeals to the international community. 54 Despite
that--or because of that-the protests continued to grow, as did the violence of Qaddafi's
response to them, until the country was engulfed in a civil war, pitting the Libyan rebels against
the army and Qaddafi sympathizers.
President Obama's first response to the escalation was to enact harsh sanctions against
Qaddafi and others in his government to restrict his access to funds and other resources, as well
49

Matthew Weaver, Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2011),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/j an/16/muanunar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising.
50
Libyan protesters clash with police in Benghazi, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2011 ),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/feb/16/libyan-protesters-clash-with-police.
51
Violence in Bahrain and Libya -Friday 18 Februa1y, THE GUARDIAN NEWS BLOG (Feb. 18, 2011 03:41),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlblog/20 11/feb/18/middle-east-protests-live-updates. Benghazi has special
significance in Libyan history. During the time of the Kingdom of Libya, created in 1951, Benghazi was the
cultural center, even as Tripoli was the capital. As such, there was a tremendous rivalry between the two cities.
Thus, it was from Benghazi that Qaddafi launched his coup in 1969. Erzsebet N. Rozsa and Laszlo Tuske, Libya:
The Other Way or Are the Tribes Ruling the Agenda? 5, 7, HUNGARIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Oct.
12, 20 11); Profile: Muammar Gaddafi, BBC NEWS (June 27, 20 11), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa12488278.
52
Ian Black, Libya on brink as protests hit Tripoli, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 20 11),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/20 11/feb/20/libya-defiant-protesters-feared-dead.
53 ld
54
Christian Pippan, The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Militmy Intervention, and International Law 159,
JURIDIKUM (2/2011).
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as against the National Oil Corporation and its subsidiaries. 55 American oil companies, however,
were outspokenly opposed to those types of unilateral sanctions, arguing that such a measure
cannot succeed on its own and that the US should seek to work through the UN and implement a
multilateral strategy. 56

Of course, such a statement is highly self-serving, given that such

sanctions make it more difficult for oil companies to do business in Libya. The US was also
adamant about pursuing multiple non-military avenues for ameliorating the situation in Libya.
The US made available $47 million to international and regional humanitarian organizations to
ensure that aid gets to those who need it. 57 The Obama administration also "ratchet[ed] up
pressure and further isolate[ed] Colonel Qadhafi and his associates" by making it explicitly clear
that he "ha[d] lost the legitimacy to lead, and must go." 58 As a parallel strategy, the US also
immediately began "supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people," by sending
Secretary Clinton to meet with a representative from the Transitional National Council to discuss
strategy. 59
Nevertheless, imposing sanctions was the only unilateral action that Obama took60-after
that, and even during that time, he ardently pursued an international approach through the United
Nations. 61 In the case of Libya, the United Nations-with the active participation of the United

55

Libya: Oil Industry Group Opposes Obama 's Sanctions, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 4, 20 II),
http://motherjones.com/politics/20 Il/03/libya-qaddafi-usa-engage-sanctions; Exec. Order 13566, Blocking Property
and Prohibiting Certain Transactions Related to Libya, Feb. 25, 20 1I, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/20 Il/02/25/executive-order-libya; Libya: ,Defining US National Security Interests, March 3I, 20 II,
Testimony by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
http://www.state.gov/s/dlformer/steinberg/remarks/2011/I69301.htm.
56
Libya: Oil Industry Group Opposes Obama's Sanctions, supra note 55.
57
Steinberg testimony, supra note 55.
58 /d.
59
60

/d.

The sanctions were tightened in June. OFAC Tightens Libya Sanctions, Press Release, US Department of
Treasury (June 2I, 2011 ), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases?Pages/tg 1213 .aspx.
61
"Both President Obama and Secretary Clinton are avoiding unilateral decisions, continually emphasizing that the
Libyan actions are under the UN auspices." Lisa M. Ruth, Does the U.S. policy on Libya signal a shift in foreign
policy implementation?, WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 29, 20II),
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/life-lisa/20 II/mar/29/does-us-policy-libya-signal-shift-

States-became involved in the Libyan conflict very soon after the violence in Libya escalated to
outright war. As early as 24 February, six days after the regime's crackdown in Benghazi,
Security Council members were informally discussing the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter
to take deterrent action against the regime. 62 The following day, the Human Rights Council
convened a special meeting to discuss the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Libya; it
issued a resolution condemning the widespread human rights abuses and authorized the creation
of a commission to conduct an inquiry into the situation. 63
A day later, the Security Council passed Resolution 1970. 64 The resolution called for an
immediate cessation of hostilities and referred the situation-dating back to 15 February-to the
International Criminal Court. 65 It also instituted an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset freeze,
to try to inhibit Qaddafi from accessing the resources necessary to continue fighting. 66 Further
action by the UN was urged upon it by the Libyan Transitional National Council, but the
Security Council remained passive until the Arab League appealed to it to immediately
implement a no-fly zone over Libya, leading to Resolution 1973 passed on 17 March. 67 The

foreign-policy-it:. It is interesting to note this change in foreign policy tactics. Over the past decade, the United
States has never hesitated to use harsh words and sharp actions to signal its discontent with an international
situation, often asking individual countries to join it, bypassing the United Nations framework. An example of this
may be the coalition-of-the-willing in Iraq. It may be that the US has learned its lesson, that unilateral actions often
have unacceptably high costs, fmancially and in human lives. ("The move from costly and ineffective bullying to
balanced international participation is actually a savvy way to demonstrate US concerns without the enormous
expense and human cost of a ground intervention." Ruth.) The 2003 war in Iraq may be one such example.
62
Update Report: Libya, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT 1 (Feb. 25, 20 11), available at
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTisG/b.6586331/k.D62C/Update_Report_No_3brLibyabr25_
February_20 1l.htm.
63
ld; Update Report: Libya, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT 3 (Mar. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTisG/b.6621881/k.63C4/Update_Report_No_lbrLibyabr14_
March_201l.htm; Human Rights Council Res. S-15, Feb. 25, 2011, U.N. GAOR 15th special Sess., A/HRC/S-15/L.l
(Feb. 23, 20 11).
64
March Update Report, supra note 63 at 2.
65
S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2; see generally March Update Report, supra note 63.
66
S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 2.
67
Richard Leiby and Muhammad Mansour, Arab League asks U.N. for no-fly zone over Libya, , WASHINGTON POST
(Mar. 12, 201 I), http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/arab-league-asks-un-for-no-fly~zone-overlibya/20 11/03/12/ABoieOR_story.html; March Update Report, supra note 63 at 1; Christopher M. Blanchard, Cong.
Research Service, RL33142, LIBYA: UNREST AND U.S. POLICY 3 (March 29, 2011).
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resolution called for a cease-fire, no-fly zone, and invoked the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
in authorizing UN member states, whether acting nationally or within the sphere of a regional
organization, to take "all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas
under threat of attack. " 68
On 19 March, the United States (and other countries) "began military operations against
Libyan targets." 69 By the 28th, a coalition had formed of European, North American, and Middle
Eastern countries contributing efforts to maintain the military operations, no-fly zone, and arms
embargo. 70

That coalition was then subsumed under NATO command and control under

Operation Unified Protector. 71 In these ways, by working through and with the UN (and NATO
in the military aspect of the multilateral response to Libya), the US has been able to retain a
fairly low profile while at the same time promoting its values internationally. 72

B.

The Spectre ofLibyan Oil

Yet we would be remiss not to recall the close associations that the US has had with oilproducing regimes. Such associations have led to a general wariness of US intentions in its
foreign policy, coloring its actions.

As much as nobody wishes to acknowledge that fact,

protecting the investments of US companies in Libya is a consideration that must inevitably be
taken into account. This concern is apparent in no less than a State Department cable released by
WikiLeaks, which indicated that over the past few years, Qaddafi had gotten considerably

68

69

70
71
72

S.C. Res.l973, supra note 2; Pippan, supra note 54 at 159-60.
Blanchard, supra note 67 at 6.
!d.
!d. at 7.
!d.

~
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tougher in his negotiations with oil companies. 73 He had "threatened to dramatically reduce
Libya's oil production and I or expel ... U.S. oil and gas companies." 74
This belligerent posturing was in addition to Qaddafi' s increasing emphasis on "Libyan
resource nationalism." 75

Qaddafi had begun verbally attacking the foreign oil companies,

demanding that having made billions off of Libyan oil, they give back to the people. 76 Oil
companies were forced to rename their local subsidiaries to "Libyanize" them; and oil companies
were pressured to hire Libyan personnel, including managers, financial analysts, and human
resources directors. 77

These very strict and nationalistic measures were in fact counter-

productive to the production of oil as they ''jeopardize[d] efficient exploitation of Libya's
extensive oil and gas reserves." 78
As the conflict began to rage around him in February, Qaddafi closed the country's ports,
thereby suspending oil exports. 79 With the suspension, foreign oil companies scaled back some
of their operations. 80 Qaddafi then ratcheted up his rhetoric by threatening, a day later, that now
that "the oil flow has been stopped, how are the people going to sustain a living? Will Bin Laden
provide for them?"81 He backed up his words by turning his forces loose on the oil fields,

73

Steven Mufson, Conflict in Libya: US. oil companies sit on sidelines as Gaddafi maintains hold, WASHINGTON
POST (June 10, 20 II), http://www .washingtonpost.com/business/economy/conflict-in-libya-us-oil-companies-sit-onsidelines-as-gaddafi-maintains-hold/20 11/06/03/AGJq2QPH_ story.html
74
ld (quoting Cable 08TRIPOLI2I4, "GOL Still Bristling Over Victims ofTerrorism Legislation," 12 March 2008
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bombing various oil installations over the course of the war. 82 While the NATO airstrikes
authorized by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1973 would help protect the civilians who
were being killed by their own leader, they could also potentially help to depose the ruler who
had made oil investment so onerous, thereby securing the oil flow. 83 Had the Qaddafi regime
somehow survived despite the international community's response, it is not inconceivable that,
given his previous rhetoric, he may have retaliated against the countries supporting the rebels by
shutting down and closing off foreign investment in Libyan oil.
Even with Qaddafi still at large, the Transitional National Council (TNC) began to take
steps to normalize oil exports, in which it was helped by the United States. As early as June, the
US had begun publicly encouraging countries to buy oil from the Council. 84 The US Treasury
Department also enacted a new licensing policy to ease companies' restrictions from sanctions. 85
The Council took a major step on 11 September, announcing that oil production would resume,
mainly in eastern Libya. 86

With Qaddafi gone, the interim government of the Transitional

National Council has announced that it will honor all the contracts signed under the former
regime, and that in fact, it will shortly seek out new contracts. 87 The TNC has also signaled that
while it will adjudge proposals based on the same objective criteria as before-technical
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expertise and quality of labor-those companies based in countries that actively helped the
rebels "are likely to get preferential treatment. " 88
While the United States could not have been aware of this additional incentive to get
involved in the humanitarian intervention, this subjective picking of new contracts is very likely
to benefit US companies such as ExxonMobil and the consortium of Amerada Hess,
ConocoPhillips and Marathon Oil. 89 This will in turn help to remedy stagnant oil production,
which, due to Qaddafi's tough negotiation stance and resulting capped off at around 1.5 to 1.6
million barrels per day, in contrast to the peak of 3 million in the early 1970s.90 The TNC's
liberal and hands-off approach to the oil market in Libya will have the dual benefit of increasing
the profits of those companies lucky enough to be awarded a contract, and help to increase oil
production, thereby increasing revenues for rebuilding and helping drive global oil prices down.
The fundamental bottom line is that oil from Libya is an extremely valuable asset, and in
many ways, irreplaceable. Libyan oil is very strategically located as it is close to Europe; it is
also comparably easily extracted and is of fine quality (so-called "sweet crude"). 91 There are
special refineries built and equipped to exclusively refine sweet Libyan crude. The refineries
would be hard-pressed to modify their equipment in order to process, for example, heavier Saudi
crude. 92 Libya also has the largest discovered reserves in Africa. 93

The disruption of oil

production in Libya-where one of the main basins surrounds Sirte, Qaddafi' s hometown, and
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where much of the later fighting was concentrated94-would not only (and has not only) impact
exports to Europe, but would also have negative consequences for the recovering world
economy.

95

Indeed, repercussions have already been felt. The war severely damaged more than

10% of Libya's oil production infrastructure and the "pipelines may be clogged with waxy crude
oil after remaining stagnant for months." 96 While it only provides about 2% of the global oil
output, the reduction from 1.6 million barrels per day to little more than a trickle (about 50,000
barrels a day) has had a noticeable effect on the world oil market, and it may be a while before
Libyan oil production returns to full capacity. 97

Nevertheless, oil production now having

resumed in earnest, it has actually been recovering faster than expected. 98 The refineries are
already producing 600,000 barrels a day-up from the 50,000 they were producing during the
conflict-and the International Energy Agency estimates that this number could increase to near
half of its pre-war levels of 1.6 million by the end of the year. 99
Thus the forceful responses by the United States and the United Nations, while
predominantly fueled by concerns of the grave humanitarian conditions in Libya, were also
motivated by the need to secure the supply of oil from Libya in order to preserve calm global oil
markets.
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The Syrian Spring

The relationship that the United States has had with Syria has often been contradictory
and fluctuating. In 1979, the State Department placed Syria on its State Sponsors of Terrorism
list, a move that triggered already-enacted sanctions against the regime. 100 The sanctions forbade
foreign assistance to those countries determined to be aiding and abetting international terrorism,
and they limited exports to those countries to less than $7 million. 101 These measures effectively
terminated all US aid to Syria, which from 1950 to 1981 had totaled some $627.4 million, going
mainly towards projects such as "water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and
health and agricultural research." 102
But the strategic geographic location of Syria-"situated between the current flashpoint
of Iraq and the perennial hotspots of Israel-Palestine, Lebanon and Iran" 103-has made it almost
impossible for the United States to maintain its strict stance. As such, foreign policy towards
Syria has swung between "engagement and dialogue" and "isolation and monologue.'' 104
Relations with Hafez al-Asad, the late father of current Syrian ruler Bashar al-Asad, were fairly
pragmatic as the United States sought to balance the influence of the Soviet Union in the
region. 105 Once the Cold War paradigm became irrelevant, the US nevertheless continued to
engage Syria as a "critical partner for maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East." 106
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Therefore, the US ensured that Syria was part of the US-Arab coalition of forces that was
assembled to oppose Saddam Hussein's invasion into Kuwait in 1991. 107
The change in Syrian leadership from father Hafez to son Bashar and the attacks of
September 11, 200 1 completely altered the foreign policy landscape the US had been pursuing
with Syria for some 20 years. Despite the valuable intelligence that Syria provided on al-Qaeda
and unprecedented cooperation with the FBI, President George W. Bush heightened his harsh
rhetoric against the regime and demanded that Syria pursue those same anti-terrorist policies
against Hamas and Hezbollah, two groups it had been not-so-secretly harboring. 108 Additionally,
the accusation by the United States that Syria was pursuing nuclear capabilities and chemical and
biological weapons with the aid of Iran and North Korea, strained relations. 109 In response,
Bashar broke with the non-confrontational policies of his father and grew bolder and more
belligerent in challenging US involvement in the region. 110 The "severe fracture, ... almost to
the point of a complete break" in US-Syrian relations occurred with Syrian support for Iraq's
Saddam Hussein prior to his downfall and the safe passage Syria granted to al-Qaeda and
Palestinian activists flooding into Iraq. 111
In December 2003, and in accordance with the increasingly icy policies towards Syria,
the US enacted the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. 112 The Act
required that the President sanction Syria until "it ceases support for international terrorist
groups, ends its occupation of Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction,

101
108

Id

Id at 95; Zisser Bad Habits Die Hard, supra note 32, at 31-2.
Zisser Bad Habits Die Hard, supra note 32 at 31; Eyal Zisser, Syria's Diplomatic Comeback: What Next?, 14
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 1, 111 (March 2009).
110
Zisser Bad Habits Die Hard, supra note 32 at 29.
111
Id at 35; Zisser Syria's Comeback, supra note 109 at 109.
112
Sadat and Jones, supra note 103 at 96.
109

-20-

... and has ceased supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq." 113 Additional general and
individual sanctions continued to be imposed on the country and some of its ruling members,
particularly in the aftermath of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri
in February 2005, in which Syria was heavily-though without much proof-implicated. 114

A.

The Responses to the Uprisings
The new administration under President Obama sought to pursue a "guarded but genuine

diplomacy with Syria," as it recognized that Syria "links the Israeli, Lebanese and Iraqi issues
together," and so "any breakthrough in any one of them" will take active US engagement. 115 The
uprisings that began in March in the Syrian city of Dar' a have brought an abrupt end to that
policy. A few weeks before the city erupted in protests, the police had arrested 15 schoolboys
who had sprayed anti-government graffiti onto buildings, echoing the Egyptian and Tunisian
slogans. 116 Large demonstrations protested their detention and the police opened fire, killing six
protestors. 117 The funeral procession the next day became a political rally and the security forces
responded once again with force and succeeded in sealing the city. 118 Tensions kept escalating,
protests growing, and casualties mounting.
Calls for reform were met with some partial concessions made by the regime. On April
19, the Emergency Law-in place since 1963-was lifted and various promises were made to
"loosen media restrictions, abolish state security courts, release political prisoners, and allow
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'approved' demonstrations." 119 Yet the most consistent response to protests has been increased
heavy-handed repression by the police and security I military forces. By June, Syrian forces had
forcibly taken control of various rebellious cities, including Jisr al Shoghour, Hams, Hama and
Deir El Zour. 120 The death toll, as currently estimated by the United Nations, is over 4000 and
could be significantly over that number. 121
The United States initially responded very similarly to the way it did with the protests in
Libya, as the two countries have been treated similarly by the US in the past: by imposing
sanctions. However, the response was more delayed and far more timid and hesitant. The first
step that President Obama took was on 29 April, over a month after the frrst crackdown, and was
to block the property and assets of three high-ranking Syrian officials and two entities. 122 But
even before that, Secretary of State Clinton made clear that military intervention was not
presently being contemplated as an option. 123 More sanctions were enacted in May, this time
targeting President Asad along with six other close officials. 124 However, given that the United
States has very few economic interests in Syria, the sanctions are much more of a symbolic
nature, and ones geared more towards persuading other countries-who have more significant
ties-to take action. 125 Indeed, the swath of unilateral sanctions in place since 1979 have left
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"US adversaries and even allies . . . eager to fill the economic vacuum left by American
companies," at the expense of US loss of trade and investment. 126
As such, the US has also employed a heavy regimen of rhetoric, urging such countries to
use their economic leverage and increase the pressure on the Syrian government in order to stop
the violence. 127 With the United States not pursuing as active a role in the Syrian uprising, the
Arab League-as in Libya-has taken over the reins. In early November, it suspended Syria
from the organization and several weeks later imposed a strong set of sanctions on the regime
after it failed to allow international observers into the country, as previously agreed upon. 128 The
various measures include an asset freeze, an investment embargo, a ban on commercial flights,
and a halt on funding from Arab govenunents for Syria development projects. 129 The United
Nations has tried to be as involved in the affairs of Syria as it has in Libya, but so far without
success. In early October, the Security Council had attempted to pass a resolution condemning
the Syrian repression of anti-govenunent protests, but the resolution failed to pass as China and
Russia used their veto. 130

B.

The Spectre ofSyrian Oil
There are, arguably, even more forces at work in the international community's response

to the Syrian uprising than in Libya. Any response, by whichever country, must take into
"account the Israeli-Palestinian divide, the Sunni-Shia divide, the Muslim-Christian divide,
widespread anti-Semitism, Iran's nuclear ambitions, the security of oil supplies pumped by weak
126
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regimes, al-Qaeda and related radicals, tribalism, corruption, and a picturesque lineup of
despots."

131

Oil has, however, been a largely ignored factor in the uprising, whether in the form

of Syrian oil or the supply of oil flowing from other countries (especially Iraq) through Syria.
But the uprisings have had an effect on oil in the country in many ways and fears of disturbing
Iraqi (and potentially Iranian and Saudi) oil flow have dampened the international community's
willingness to intervene.
Revenue from Syrian oil exports comprises three-quarters of Syria's economy. 132 Syrian
oil production has been falling over the years, dropping from 580,000 barrels per day in 2001 to
387,000 barrels per day in January 2011. 133 Given that oil is such a large percentage of its
economy, even though production is comparatively low, the oil sector has been an easy target for
sanctions. Both the United States and the European Union have done so, to try to reduce the
revenue filling the pockets of the Asad regime. 134 New sanctions by the Obama administration,
enacted in August, specifically prohibit any US entity from conducting any transactions in Syrian
petroleum products. 135 The EU sanctions have been particularly devastating for the regime, as
the bulk of its exports flow to European countries; Syria has had to reduce production from
380,000 barrels to approximately 250,000 and this number may continue to fall. 136 But while the
export of oil from Syria has gotten more difficult, Syria is likely to continue exporting, even
though it has to turn to "alternative" countries, such as "Russia, China or Malaysia. " 137
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Additionally, in order to be able to find just the right buyer, "Syria will [probably] have to offer a
discount of up to 20 per cent to attract buyers." 138 If Russia and China are going to be the
primary beneficiaries of such a discount, it is highly unlikely they will consider taking any type
of action that would jeopardize cheaper oil supply-even as their preliminary objections to
intervention in the Security Council have been on grounds of territorial sovereignty and illegal
expansion of the Libyan military mandate. 139
The very small percentage that Syria contributes to the crude oil market has had only a
negligible effect on global prices, even though the market is very tight. 140 Unlike Libyan oil
production, which was reduced to almost nothing because of the raging conflict, Syria is still
able to produce at over 50% of its capacity, even if the reduction is due to sanctions. Yet there
are other, far more pressing, oil concerns in Syria, aside from domestic production. "Syria ...
occup[ies] the most strategic position [geographically] in the transit" of regional oil; in fact, it is
"indispensable." 141 As such, it has served as the transit country for oil from Iraq and Saudi
Arabia. 142 The 500,000 barrel a day Trans-Arabian pipeline that transported Saudi oil closed in
1976 for financial reasons, but there have been proposals to rehabilitate it. 143 Syria also houses a
second pipeline from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Baniyas which, constructed in 1952, is about
500 miles long and is able to carry about 300,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day. 144 Closed originally
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in 1982, in 2000, Syria and Iraq agreed to resume pumping oil through it. 145 Oil flow was shut
off again in 2003 when it was damaged during the US invasion of Iraq, but in August 2007, the
two countries agreed to repair and re-open it. 146 While it has yet to re-open, Iraq has new plans
to build three pipelines through Syria, to allow for the export of heavy and light oil, and natural
gas. 147 Towards that end, in August, Iran, Iraq and Syria agreed to build one such pipeline
through Syria to access new European markets. 148 The deal, worth $10 billion, will carry Iranian
gas and should take between three to five years to complete. 149
Countries intervening in Syria would be paying a high price, as any threats to physical
security would effectively postpone these new projects potentially by years. In addition, any
attempt at regime change could also make finalization of the pipeline agreements more uncertain.
As a more important transit country than production country, the security of Syria and the
pipelines that run through it, are undoubtedly of very large concern to the international
community. The failure to repair the old pipelines and construct the new ones would prevent the
reduction of transit costs and increase diversification of oil flow, which would be very beneficial
in the event of a disruption of oil supply elsewhere. 150 The precariousness and importance of
such security was heightened in July when a portion of a function cross-border pipeline was
145
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blown up in Mosul, Iraq.

151

The damaged pipeline was shut off until it could be repaired. 152

The Syrian rebels have already adopted this technique as a way to force the govenunent to listen
to their demands. On 8 December, an "armed terrorist group"-what the Syrian government has
termed the rebels-blew up a pipeline in Homs. 153 This was apparently the third time that oil
installations have been attacked-one had been bombed in July in Deir al-Zour and another, also
in July, again near Homs. 154
The situation in Syria is less than clear and very complicated because Syria occupies a
delicate-but important-position geostrategically in the Middle East. Internal disruptions of oil
production and redirecting of exports to different markets has had some, but not too profound,
effect on world oil markets. Even further disruption of the comparatively small scale of oil
production will still not likely have as harsh an effect on global oil prices as Libya has. Thus the
links between oil and international intervention in response to its Arab Spring uprising are more
tenuous. However, Syria is also a very important! oil transit country, and as such has several
new pipeline projects under completion. The need to maintain sufficient security to allow the
construction of those three new pipelines-as well as the need to maintain political stability and
a diplomatic environment friendly to such investment deals-is a consideration that may well
influence those countries resisting international intervention. The two most opposed, Russia and
China, in fact stand to benefit from the status quo of no intervention, given that they are
receiving a discounted supply of Syrian oil. But the United States, too, has been coy about the
prospects for intervention. The apprehension that disruption of the production and transit of oil
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in Syria would have consequences-though the scale is unknown-not only for the prices of
crude oil but also on the supplies of those countries that rely on Syrian, Iraqi, Iranian, and
potentially even Saudi exports, could be a factor arresting US action; indeed, it may even be the
uncertainty of the effect of the disruption urging caution.

IV.

The Bahraini Spring

Unlike with Libya and Syria, the United States and Bahrain have had a very close
relationship since 1948. That was the year that Bahrain agreed to the presence of a U.S. naval
command, in exchange for a security guarantee, to protect it from its more powerful
neighbors. 155 Since then, the military and diplomatic ties between the two countries have only
increased. The US opened an embassy in the capital of Manama in 1971, and Bahrain now also
houses the US Naval Fifth Fleet and hosts about 2300 military personnel from the United
States. 156 In 2002, President George W. Bush made Bahrain a "major non-NATO ally," a legal
designation that allows the United States to sell the country weapons. 157 With such a close
strategic partnership, Bahrain and the US have cooperated in combating terrorism and piracy in
the Persian Gulf, checking the nuclear expansion of Iran, and addressing various threats from
Iraq and Afghanistan. 158 Thus when the Arab Spring winds blew into the little Gulf monarchy,
the United States paid very close attention.
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The Responses to the Bahraini Spring
Immediately following the success of the Egyptian people in toppling the regime of

Hosni Mubarak, Bahraini Shiites took to the streets on 13 February to protest the Sunnidominated government. 159 The Bahraini king, in anticipation of the Arab Spring momentum, had
tried to appease his citizens with a $2700 payment, but this failed to stop the protests. 160 The
government then turned the security forces out onto the protesters, who had gathered in Pearl
Square by the thousands. 161 Several people were killed and many wounded as rubber bullets and
tear gas were used. 162 The US began to feel unease and urged the Bahraini government to refrain
from using force to dispel the protesters. 163
Heeding the warnings of the United States, the king switched tactics by ordering the
security forces to stand down and proposed the opening of a dialogue with Shiite leaders for
reforms. 164 This tack looked promising, at least on the side of the government, as the king
released and pardon 25 political prisoners and changed several of his cabinet posts. 165 However,
with the dialogue not forthcoming, protests erupted again and grew to overwhelm the security
forces. 166 As a result, Bahrain turned to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and requested that
its members send it assistance in suppressing the rebellion. 167 On 14 March, 1200 troops from
Saudi Arabia and 800 from the United Arab Emirates crossed into Bahrain and were immediately
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placed around Manama to help "protect key sites." 168 This protection, however, effectively
allowed the king to declare a state of emergency and, with the help of the GCC forces, forcibly
remove protesters from Pearl Square. 169 There were more protester deaths attributed to this
crackdown, and many other opposition figures were arrested and detained. 170
The violence of the repression has deeply disturbed the United States, which has
nevertheless continued to merely "chide" Bahrain. 171 The US has not "called on [the Bahraini
government or even the king to step down] as it had on beleaguered autocratic leaders in Egypt,
Tunisia, Syria and Yemen.'' 172 On the contrary, after the king released the political prisoners,
Secretary Clinton praised the move and encouraged the opposition groups to acquiesce to the
king's proposal for a dialogue on reform. 173 The US has also continued to make statements
supporting the king's lukewarm attempts to reform and even sent over an envoy to help with the
process. 174
The only action that the US has taken that is even somewhat commensurate with the strict
sanctions that the US imposed on Libya and Syria is that it has delayed a $53 million arms deal
with Bahrain pending the publication of a report into the alleged human rights abuses committed
during the crackdown. 175 The report was requested by Bahrain-and will be paid for by that
country-as a response to the international criticism in the way it handed disbanding of its
protests. 176 The report was originally due in October, but has since been pushed back to 23
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November. Once published, Congress and the Obama administration have pledged to "review
the report's findings on allegations of torture and repression against the Bahrain government." 177
The 500-page report, released on 23 November, found that the security forces deployed to
subdue the rebellion "used excessive force," and that those arrested were subject to torture and
deprived of their basic human rights. 178 The grave charges contained in the report will need to be
taken very seriously by Congress in its deliberation over the arms deal, the status of which is as
yet undetermined. Congress also has to take into account both the fact that agreeing to the deal
would "highlight[ ... ] a double standard in US policy toward popular Arab uprisings," and be
unjustifiable "if the stage seems to be set for another crackdown. " 179 The multitude of sensitive
US national security interests that are intertwined in Bahrain are making it extremely difficult for
the US to pursue a policy more in line with those it has adopted towards Libya and Syria.

B.

The Spectre ofBahraini Oil
The title of this section is somewhat of a misnomer. Bahrain is not a major oil producing

country, as it has, for the most part, exhausted its crude oil reserves. 180 But Bahrain is very
strategically located and it occupies a very delicate position in the Middle East. It is a very small
island in the Persian Gulf surrounded on three sides by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq. The impact
that a strong US response to Bahrain's own internal discontent would have on oil and the oil
market-ignoring all the other interests that the US has in the country-could have
reverberations throughout the entire region. This effect is discussed in more detail in the section
on the global oil market, infra.
177
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The Global Oil Market

Just as the security of individual countries' oil supplies is an important factor in the
United States' and international community's responses to the Arab Spring uprisings, so too is
the effect that disruption of those oil supplies will have on the global oil market. The slightest
fluctuation in supply to the market is almost guaranteed to cause a sharp fluctuation in price"the price of oil ... tends to be more volatile than prices of manufactured goods ... due in great
part to the inelasticity of demand for and supply of oil." 181 Because countries have fairly few
options when a major source of their oil fails to deliver, they have little choice but to pay the
increased prices. 182 Therefore, with Arab Spring uprisings raging primarily in oil-producing
countries, the rebellions-and even war-has the potential to affect oil production. Indeed, the
conflicts have already affected oil production and the global oil market has felt the squeeze.
The United States, in particular has a big stake in the world oil market, because it must
increasingly import oil from overseas to compensate for its lack of domestic production. But it
does not have very much influence over it. This is especially because the Organization of
Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) produces 38% of the world's oil and has "the potential
to exercise market power rather than just respond to market signals." 183 In other words, it can act
as a cartel. While it does not itself import much-or any-oil from Libya or Syria, "disruption
of supplies ... anywhere in the world will be distributed across the world market." 184 Thus
losing the 2% of world oil that comes from Libya, even though it doesn't have a direct impact on
US imports, has the overall effect of raising oil prices globally.
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In the past, when various events 185-including OPEC supply reductions-"reduced
supply and pushed up prices, the U.S. economy suffered a fall in its terms of trade and U.S.
consumers have suffered a loss in purchasing power." 186 Thus limiting the decrease of oil
production from the various conflicts, in order to limit the shocks to the oil market, is a very real
concern for the US. For good reason, too, as the suspension of oil exports from Libya in late
February had an imn1ediate impact on oil prices. When the fighting began, crude oil was being
sold for $84 a barrel. 187 Prices quickly rose above $93 and spiked at over $110 in April. 188
Much of this increase had to do with Qaddafi's attack on the town of Ras Lanuf, an extremely
important oil port. 189 The highest price recorded over the course of the Arab Spring was $127 in
April.r9o
Equally important, however, in the determination of oil prices is "pure fear in the
markets." 191 Therefore, the anticipation of shocks to the oil market can have a large impact on
prices. When Qaddafi announced that he was digging in for a "long, drawn-out war," prices rose
in response, because the implication of such a long war was reduction of oil supply and
particularly a long recovery period before supplies could be resumed. 192 Such considerations
were likely in the minds of the diplomats as the United Nations Security Council authorized the
185
186
187
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The sooner the conflict could be ended, the sooner oil

production could resume and prices drop. In response to the tremendous price hikes, in late
June, the United States and 27 other countries of the International Energy Agency coordinated to
release 60 million barrels of oil from their strategic reserves, in order to lessen the pressure on
prices. 193 The announcement itself--not even the actual release-had the immediate impact of
"accelerat[ing] the drop in prices ... taking them to levels not seen since Libyan oil exports were
virtually halted by political turmoil four months ago." 60 million barrels, compared to the
amount of oil produced every day, is "relatively trivial" but it sent a strong message to markets
that the United States and other countries were not going to let the reduction in supply cause
prices to spiral out of controL 194 It also helped calm the markets after OPEC failed to reach an
agreement, in early June, that would have increased member states' production quotas easing the
supply. 195

As the Libyan rebels began to push towards Tripoli in late August, there was

widespread speculation that the war would soon be over. 196 The hope that Qaddafi' s regime
would be overthrown within a few days, which would lead to a resumption of oil exports and
production soon thereafter, led to a drop of more than $3 in the price of crude oil, trading below
$106.197

As events progressed, the world oil market generally became "increasingly concerned
about a cascade of events in the [Middle East] regime, ... which hit oil-rich Libya ... and is now
engulfing Bahrain" and has also spread to Syria. 198 With Syria and Bahrain, the concern is less
about the impact full-scale conflict and potential intervention may have, than about the ripple
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effect it may have on neighboring countries and their oil. Thus the impact on the market and on
prices has been more indirect, as output in those countries has not been suspended.

Syria is

already invested in the construction of several new pipelines that will transport Iraqi and Iranian
oil to the Mediterranean. The potential loss or long-term disruption of a significant portion of
the 2.7% of world oil output that Iraq produces and the 4.9% that Iran produces bode ill and
would deeply impact oil prices. 199

This may be a consideration deterring international

intervention.
The situation in Bahrain is even more sensitive given that it borders Saudi Arabia, the
OPEC country that produces 12.1% of the world's oil.200 Bahrain's request for assistance from
the Gulf Cooperation Council in quelling its protests, which resulted in 1200 Saudi troops being
landed in the Gulf island, has already involved the large oil-producing country in its Arab Spring
affairs. 201 Thus any new confrontation between protesters and Bahraini security forces, or in the
extreme eventuality, between Bahraini security forces and an international intervention coalition,
would be very likely to entangle Saudi Arabia as well. Given that Saudi Arabia has had to boost
oil production in order to compensate for the Libyan shortages, it would highly counterproductive, and potentially catastrophic, for the international community to threaten either
Bahrain or Saudi Arabia in such a way as to force the country to scale back its production. This
would roil the world oil market and prices would skyrocket. 202
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In addition, Bahrain is very strategically placed in the Persian Gulf. It is close to the

Strait of Honnuz, through which 15.5 million barrels of oil pass every day. 203 This makes up
about 17% of all oil traded worldwide daily. 204 Escalation of violence requiring a renewed Saudi
presence or triggering an international intervention would severely jeopardize the security of
these oil shipping lanes. The US naval presence quartered in Bahrain could potentially be asked
to secure the lanes in order to maintain the flow of transit, but with a conflict raging in Bahrain,
it is likely that the military installation there would be obliged to withdraw. If the security
deteriorates enough, the oil will have to find an alternate route by which to reach its destination,
increasing its transportation costs?05 Even the threat or fear of a disruption in the shipping
conducted through the Persian Gulf could easily send prices flying again.

Intervention is

therefore a step that clearly the international community has to take very seriously, as it would
have far-reaching repercussions, not merely on Bahrain itself, but on Saudi Arabia and the world
oil market.
The stability and security of the global oil market is of great importance to the United
States as it is heavily reliant upon it but exercises little influence over it. The numerous Arab
Spring uprisings, which have largely occurred in oil-producing countries, have put the US on
notice that any action it takes should be done after an analysis of the repercussions it will have on
oil prices.
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VI.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring uprisings that have gripped the Middle East since late December 20 10
have been championed as the people rebelling against oppressive regimes to finally assert their
right to freedom.

But the United States' responses-which theoretically should be fully

supportive-have been more tempered, as the Middle East is a very sensitive area embedded
with US national security interests. Many of the rebelling countries are those with which the US
has pursued unholy alliances-one, to protect against the spread of communism by the Soviet
Union (as in Syria) and two, to protect its supply of oil.
The presence of oil in these countries, as well as the roles that they play in stabilizing the
world oil market, has complicated matters for the United States.

Given that the US is

increasingly reliant on foreign oil imports to fuel its oil consumption, balancing oil and
humanitarian interests in its foreign policy towards the Arab Spring countries has been an
important task. But in fact, oil has been the one factor underpinning the whole spectrum of
responses. The US and the international community intervened in Libya for the same reason that
it has not done so in Syria and Bahrain: namely, oil. In order tore-secure production in Libya,
the US and the international community intervened early; to forestall disruptions in Syria and
Bahrain, the US and its allies have so far declined to intervene. Only time will tell if these
considerations get outweighed by others, such as humanitarian concerns. Thus, while US and
international policy may seem divergent depending on the country, in fact it is all bound by the
same considerations for oil supplies and the steadiness of the global oil market.

